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Abstract 
 
With the reduction in tariff barriers, Non-tariff and behind-the-border 
measures (NTM and BTB) have increased in importance. This paper 
surveys the state of knowledge with the view to drawing implications for 
policy suggestions to reduce those NTM barriers that are welfare reducing. 
Following a description of data bases and their shortcomings, the paper 
reviews the state of understanding on the effects of NTMs on trade flows. 
The more difficult issue of translating these effects into welfare 
implications are covered next. The paper concludes with different 
approaches at reducing NTMs. 
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Glossary of Abbreviations 
AFTA  Asian Free Trade Area 
APEC  Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (21 countries in the Asia 
  Pacific region) 
AVE  Ad valorem equivalent 
BTB  Behind-the-border measures that include 
CODEX Codex Alimentarius Commission  
EBA  Everything but Arms initiative of the EU giving duty-free  
 quota-free access to LDCs in the EU market 
HS  Harmonized system 
DCs  Developing countries (other than LDCs) 
DSU  Dispute Settlement Understanding 
FTAs  Free-trade Areas  
GSP  Generalized system of preferences 
IOE  International Office of Epizootics 
IPPC  International Plant Protection Convention 
LDCs  The list of 50 Least-developed-countries  
MFA    Multi fiber agreement 
NTBs  Non-tariff barriers (subset of NTMs that are welfare-reducing  
NTM  Non-tariff measures 
OTRI  Overall Trade Restrictiveness Index 
PTAs  Preferential trade agreement (often non-reciprocal such as  
 GSP or EBA) 
PSRO  Product Specific rules origin usually defined at the HS-6 level 
QRs  Quantitative Restrictions 
RIA  Regional Integration Agreement 
RoO  Rules of Origin 
S&D  Special and Differential Treatment for LDCs (longer time  
  frame to adjust to new rules complement by TA) 
SPS  Sanitary and phytosanitary measures 
TA  Technical Assistance 
TF  Trade Facilitation negotiations 
VER     Voluntary Export Restraint 
WTS  World Trading System 
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1. Introduction  
 
The evidence on the various barriers to trade--natural and policy related--
points to high ‘trade costs’ which have been invoked to explain several 
puzzles in macroeconomics (see Obsfeld and Rogoff, 2000). The growing 
literature is also struggling to come up with better estimates of these trade 
costs and, for those that are policy-imposed, which ones are ‘actionable’, 
i.e. are welfare-decreasing and could be eliminated or reduced by policy 
action. Take two examples. The costs associated with cross-border trade 
between two well-integrated countries, the US and Canada, have been 
estimated to be as high as 70% (see Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2004). 1 
Another literature on the patterns of bilateral trade is still to resolve the 
distance puzzle (why low-income countries do not expand trade in old and 
new products with partners further away in the recent decades in spite of a 
decline in transaction costs).2  
 
 ‘Trade Costs’ are usually defined as the sum of administrative barriers, 
trade policies - tariffs and non-tariff measures (NTMs) - and transaction 
costs (transport and insurance costs). Sometimes the literature also refers 
to behind-the-border (BTB) measures to distinguish those trade costs that 
are not the result of trade policies.3 The conclusion of the Uruguay Round 
has resulted in the tarification of agriculture support measures and the 
elimination of the MFA, quotas, VERs and traditional other welfare-
reducing NTMs (because they reduce welfare, these measures are often 
called NTBs) are out of the picture. As a result, attention has focused on 
the extensive array of NTMs and BTB measures which are part of ‘trade 
costs’.  
 
                                           
1 If these estimates seem high, they are confirmed by recent estimates of the ‘border effect’ 
based on homogenous products. Using detailed data at the Universal Product code level 
for 1800 stores for a large retail chain on both sides of the US-Canada border and for 
close to 40 million products, Gopinath et al. (2009) find that for some products a retail 
price discontinuity as high as 21% for stores on either side of the border while it is close to 
zero for stores on the same side of the border. 
2 See the discussion and evidence in (Berthelon and Freund, 2008, Carrère et al., 2009, 
Disdier and Head, 2008). Regardless of the magnitude of the ‘puzzle’, it is surprising that 
the average distance of trade for low-income countries has fallen significantly over the last 
thirty years.  
3 The terminology ‘BTB measure’ was first used to distinguish between ‘deep’ and 
‘shallow’ integration in Regional Integration Agreements, ‘deep’ integration occurring 
when integration extends beyond the removal of protection (i.e.  integrating factor 
markets, combining regulatory institutions, harmonizing standards and cooperating 
intensively on trade facilitation, e.g. reducing ‘red tape’ for crossing borders). 
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NTMs are often defined by what they are not (i.e. as all measures except 
tariffs—see box 1). Some are covered in the WTO agreements4, but these 
are measures for which disciplines are minimal (countries only have to 
notify changes to the WTO to increase transparency, and many countries 
do not notify these measures). Most efforts at reducing NTMs have either 
occurred unilaterally or (mostly) at the regional level and there has been 
little progress at harmonization on a multilateral level. 
As to BTB measures, they are not covered in WTO but, evidence suggests 
that they represent significant barriers to trade (all forms of transaction 
and administrative costs, including transport-related costs). While it is 
difficult to get an informed appraisal about the relative importance of 
NTMs  vs. BTBs as barriers to trade, there is general agreement that BTBs 
are increasing in importance and that BTBs are the most important barrier 
to trade for many small landlocked or isolated economies (see Shepherd 
and Wilson, 2006, and Hoekman and Nicita, 2008) .  
 
From the point of view of gaining a better understanding of the importance 
of NTMs and of what to do about them, this note deals with three related 
questions that should help guide policies towards NTMs: 
- How important are NTMs, i.e. what impact they have on trade flows? 
Which have been identified as most significant (across sectors, 
countries)? 
- Which NTMs are justifiable, and for those that are not (some say 
NTBs, or uninformative rather than informative NTMs) what can be 
done?  
- What approaches have been or could be used to remove NTBs.  
Answering the first question helps focus on the NTMs that are binding, i.e. 
on those that reduce the volume of imports. This is a first step towards 
identifying that would be considered for policy action if they are found to 
be non-informative or welfare-reducing. The second, and more difficult 
issue, is the determination of the NTMs that are likely to be welfare-
reducing. The discussion is necessarily general, reflecting the difficulty of 
detecting which NTMs are welfare-reducing. This leads naturally to a 
discussion of approaches used to remove NTBs.  
This note is complementary to our companion note (Carrère and de Melo, 
2009) which surveys methods and main results on measurement of the 
effects of NTMs. Section 2 summarizes the growing number of data bases 
that are coming on stream and should help developing better diagnosis. 
Section 3 reviews the different approaches used to detect the effects of 
                                           
4 NTM provisions covered in the WTO agreements are : (i) article VII on customs 
valuation ; (ii) TBT agreement ; (iii) SPS agreement ; (iv) rules on import-licensing 
procedures ; (v) rules of origin ; (vi) PSI ; (vii) TRIMs ; (viiii) State-trading entreprises ; 
(ix) Trade remedies. 
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NTMs on trade flows and highlights some of the main results from these 
studies. Section 4 discusses the welfare implications of NTMs using 
illustrative examples.  Section 5 reviews the alternative approaches at 
national, regional or multilateral levels to remove NTMs that are identified 
as welfare-reducing. 
 
2. Data on NTMs 
 
Extensive data base: UNCTAD TRAINS-WITS data base  
 
Until recently, the UNCTAD Trade Analysis and Information System 
(TRAINS – accessible via WITS) data base was the only extensive data 
base covering NTMs for a large number of countries, mainly allowing the 
computation of frequency and coverage ratios. It has given rise to several 
classifications (see box 1), but this database presents two main limitations. 
 
First, it is dated (the data base has not been updated since 2001) and quite 
incomplete (a lot of missing values). As explained in detail in the annex 1, 
the data base is supposed to cover 165 countries since 1988, but in effect 
only 100 countries have more or less reliable data for the period 2000-
2001. One of the problems in the data base is that the missing entries at 
the HS-6 level may either refer to missing data or to no NTM on that tariff 
line. Hence, the interpretation of frequency and coverage ratios is subject 
to the caveats that much of the missing information is difficult to interpret 
(does no entry at the HS-6 tariff line level mean no NTM or does it 
represent missing data?).  
 
With the growing importance of NTMs as barriers to trade, awareness of 
the deficiencies of existing data bases has grown and data collection efforts 
are under way. A joint UNCTAD/WTO (ITC) project is underway to put 
together a new data base that will include two components: an enhanced 
official component much like in the current WITS-TRAINS data base but 
for more measures (see details in box 2), and also a subjective component 
based on detailed interviews for representative samples of exporting 
companies (about 400 per country).5  
 
The second main limitation of UNCTAD TRAINS relates to the frequency 
and coverage ratios reported in this database which are not informative on 
the restrictiveness of the NTMs considered. An interesting and useful 
extension of the UNCTAD TRAINS-WITS data base is the set of World 
Bank Overall Trade Restrictiveness Indices (OTRI) also covering a large 
number of countries for years around 2000. The general objectives of 
these indices are first to build more comprehensive indicators of trade 
restrictiveness that include measures of both tariff and non-tariff 
                                           
5 For preliminary results from a sample of 5 pilot countries, see Mimouni et al. (2009) 
and section 3. 
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measures; and second to allow exploring differences in the level of trade 
protection vis-à-vis different groups of countries (low-income, middle-
income, least-developed countries). However, these indices, discussed at 
greater length in our companion, have the same shortcomings that the 
UNCTAD TRAINS data base.  
 
 
 
Box 1 
Existing Categorization of NTMs* 
NTMs are broadly defined as any measure that causes a trade distortion but is not 
a tariff whereby a distortion exists when the domestic price differs from the 
border price. These include export restraints and export subsidies and the 
distortions can be intentional (e.g. a QR) or a side effect of a legitimate regulatory 
measure (e.g. a sanitary measure). If it is imposed explicitly to protect domestic 
industry by restricting import demand, it is also known as an NTB. Distortions 
mostly arise from government-imposed measures, but can also be due to 
restrictive business practices. An NTB also includes internal (i.e. behind-the-
border) measure such as a production subsidy and the many juridical and 
administrative measures covered under the Trade Facilitation negotiations of the 
Doha Round .  
Three classifications have been developed: (i) UNCTAD-TRAINS which uses the 
Trade Control Measures Coding System (TCMS) broken down into six categories: 
price control measures, finance measures, automatic licensing, quantity control 
measures, monopolistic measures and technical measures (it excludes measures 
applied to exports and production) – this classification is in the process of being 
updated (see details on the classification in Box 2); (ii) the WTO NAMA 
classification based on the 800 measures that members must notify to the WTO 
under the individual agreements---SPS, TBT,AD--- (government participation in 
trade, customs and administrative procedures (rules of origin), TBTs, SPS, 
Specific limitations (quotas), charges on imports (IPRs and safeguards) which is 
periodically incorporated in the UNCTAD data base; (iii) the Deardorff and Stern 
(1997) classification which covers much the same ground as the other two but 
includes as well a broad range of macro policies (including FDI policies, national 
policies, foreign exchange policies and corruption).   
With the elimination of the MFA and the tarification of agricultural support 
policies into two-tier tariff schemes, the number of tariff lines ridden with 
quantity and price controls has fallen from 45% in 1994 to 15% in 2004 while the 
use of TBT has almost doubled from 32% to 59%, with technical regulations are 
the most frequent important NTM.  
* For elaboration, see World Bank (2008a), Beghin (2006), and Hoekman and Nicita 
(2008). 
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Box 2 
New classification of NTMs* 
The only internationally available cross country database on NTMs is the 
UNCTAD -TRAINS database. However, this database has not been updated since 
2001 and the data is based on an obsolete classification which does not accurately 
cover new forms of non-tariff measures. In 2006, UNCTAD established the 
Group of Eminent Persons on Non Tariff Barriers (GNTB) to discuss definition, 
classification, collection and quantification of non-tariff barriers so as to identify 
data requirements, and consequently to facilitate the understanding of the 
implications of NTMs (defined as “policy measures, other than ordinary customs 
tariffs, that can potentially have an economic effect on international trade in 
goods, changing quantities traded, or prices or both”). 
The new proposed classification of NTMs follows a hierarchical "tree" structure 
where NTMs are differentiated according to 16 "branches" or chapters (denoted 
by alphabetical letters), each comprising "sub-branches" (1-digit), "twigs" (2-
digits) and "leafs" (3 digits). This classification drew upon the existing, but 
outdated, UNCTAD Coding System of Trade Control Measures (TCMCS) 
classification on NTMs, and has been modified and expanded by adding various 
categories of measures to reflect the current trading conditions. 
Im
po
rt
 
m
e
as
u
re
s
Technical
measures
Non-
technical
measures
Chapter
A    Sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS)
B    Technical barriers to trade (TBT)
C    Pre-shipment inspection and other formalities
D    Price control measures
E    Licenses, quotas, prohibition & other quantity control measures
F Charges, taxes and other para-tariff measures
G Finance measures
H Anti-competitive measures
I Trade-related investment measures
P Export-related measures (including export subsidies)
J    Distribution restrictions
K    Restrictions on post-sales services
L   Subsidies (excluding export subsidies)
M   Government procurement restrictions
N   Intellectual property
O   Rules of origin
Export 
measures
 
The updated classification includes a substantial number of new sub-categories 
on sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures and technical barriers to trade 
(TBT), and introduced a few new categories of NTMs such as “export measures”, 
“trade-related investment measures”, “distribution restrictions”, “restrictions on 
post-sales services”, “subsidies”, “measures related to intellectual property rights” 
and “rules of origin”. The classification also introduces the concept of “procedural 
obstacles”, which refers to issues related to the process of application of an NTM, 
rather than the measure itself (collected through survey data). 
* Based on the Multi-Agency Support Team “Report to the Group of Eminent persons on 
Non-Tariff Barriers” (draft/September 2009). 
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Specific NTM data bases 
 
A growing number of more specific new data bases are becoming available. 
These include a global Anti-dumping data base, a data base on EU 
standards, the WTO Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures – 
Information Management System (SPS-IMS)   and several data bases on 
trade facilitation measures.  Annex 1 gives a short description of these data 
bases. Table A1.1 summarizes this information and gives links to access 
these data. 
 
Country Cases Survey/Interview data bases 
 
In their early influential study, Deardorff and Stern (1997) noted that 
“there is no substitute for NTB and sector-specific expertise. The reliability 
of any measure of NTBs that may be constructed for particular sectors is 
limited by the knowledge of the intricacies of those sectors that bear upon 
the measures”.  Case studies aim at providing this knowledge necessary to 
classify NTMs so as to be better informed on which ones are informative 
(should be kept from a welfare point of view as e.g. certain prohibitions or 
technical regulations for health, security or environmental reasons).  We 
review here briefly the two recent initiatives to collect case studies data 
(World Bank, 2008a and 2008b and UNCTAD/WTO (ITC), 2009) 
 
The World Bank study (2008a) carried out firm and governmental official 
interviews in thirteen countries (Cambodia, Chile, China, Indonesia, 
Korea, Laos, Mexico, Singapore, Thailand, Taiwan, Peru, Vietnam). The 
objective was to get an idea of the potential for export expansion if these 
countries were to face less restrictive NTMs in their main export markets. 
The interviews were carried out with government officials and exporter 
associations and/or firms in an informal manner and varied greatly across 
countries. For example 23 interviews were conducted in Cambodia, two 
with exporter associations, the rest with government officials, while in 
Mexico it was taken from a data base in Mexico’s export-import Bank, 
while in Korea the interviews were administered to 1000 respondents that 
included firms and embassies.  
 
Another similar study was for East Africa was also conducted by the World 
Bank (2008b). The task team conducted country-by-country consultations 
with member governments and private sector firms (producers/exporters/ 
importers/transporters) with an effort to focus specifically on NTMs that 
constrain “only” the intra-region trade of EAC members. However, the 
discussions with firms often had to include their sale in other parts of the 
country and beyond the region (in Sub-Saharan Africa, especially the 
Democratic Republic of Congo). 
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The other data base initiative is the one of UNCTAD/WTO/ITC discussed 
above (see also box 2). Actually, in addition to official data collection, the 
project proposes to collect data from the private sector by conducting firm 
level surveys and by providing a web based application to facilitate data 
collection from private companies.  
 
As described in the Report of the Multi-Agency Support Team (2009), the 
primary scope of survey data collection is to obtain information on NTMs 
that poses particular burdens for private firms. This approach provides 
useful information because the presence of a large number of complaints 
gives an indication of the existence of a particularly restrictive NTM (see 
the first results for the 7 pilot countries reported in next section). However, 
the survey data collected is of limited use for statistical analysis. First, it 
always remains a difficult task to interpret the implications of subjective 
statements. Perceptions may vary according to the knowledge of the 
person interviewed, or according to the recent experience the person had. 
Perceptions are also likely to vary across countries in a given sector. 
Perceptions will also be different in countries with a strong social 
infrastructure (where meeting SPS and TBT standards will be easier) from 
those in countries with a weak social infrastructure.  
 
Moreover, in general the sample surveys are not representative of the 
country’s overall exports (some sectors are excluded a priori), or even of 
sectoral exports (large firms are excluded). Hence, as recognized by the 
Multi-Agency Support Team (2009), there are problems of endogeneity 
due to selection bias as firms that are not likely to report problems are 
excluded, but also because the incentives of firms in reporting NTMs is 
likely to be correlated with their capability in complying with the measure. 
These problems make survey data poorly suited for cross country 
comparison, and problematic to use in combination with other data sets 
such as tariffs or bilateral trade flows. 
 
 
3. Measuring the effects of NTMs on trade flows:  What Does the 
Data tell us? 
 
Results based on the UNCTAD TRAINS-WITS data base or Specific NTM 
data bases 
 
As shown in the annotated bibliography in annex 2, until recently most 
assessments on NTMs has relied on computing “frequency” and “coverage” 
ratios, most often using the WITS-TRAINS where the NTMs are entered as 
binary (zero-one) variables. For well-known reasons these indicators, 
while a useful description of the landscape, are insufficient to serve as 
proxies of the effects of these NTMs since these ratios are outcome 
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variables: a low frequency or coverage ratio could represent a very 
stringent NTM measure.  
A more systematic analysis of the effects of NTMs has focused on 
evaluating their ad-valorem equivalents (AVEs), i.e. on estimating the 
tariffs that would result in the same reduction in imports as those 
attributed to the NTMs. The large majority of studies have concentrated on 
one of two approaches.6  
The first approach uses the gravity model often focusing on the effects of 
NTMs on the volume of aggregate bilateral trade. For the purpose at hand, 
which is to detect the effects of NTMs at the product level where they are 
imposed, the gravity model has several drawbacks. First, it works better for 
aggregate trade than for trade at the product-line level. This makes it ill-
suited for the analysis of NTMs which are usually defined at the product-
level. Such estimates then need to be carried out at the most disaggregated 
product level possible. Second, any NTM is usually imposed on imports 
regardless of their origin while the gravity model seeks to explain bilateral 
trade volumes making it difficult to identify the effects of NTMs on 
bilateral trade as shown by the lack of robustness of results to the choice of 
NTM indicator (see box 3).  
                                           
6 Another approach, much less used, relies on price comparisons. It is very demanding 
because ideally it requires data at the product level (e.g. at the universal product code 
level as in Gopinath et al., 2009).  This precludes using the approach for a larger number 
of countries and products. 
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2009.33 
 
 12 
 
Box 3 
SPS and TBT Agreements: Effects on Agricultural Trade* 
 
Under the WTO SPS and TBT Agreements, members can adopt regulations which 
may influence significantly trade flows, either positively when these regulations 
provide information to consumer that are safe or negatively if they are used in a 
protectionist way. Disdier et al. (2008) use the ad-valorem equivalents (AVEs) of 
Kee et al. (2008) along with a dummy variable or a frequency index to measure 
the trade impact of SPS and TBT (measures notified to WTO) in 2004 on imports 
of 690 agricultural and food products. In the sample of 154 importing countries, 
only 92 reported SPS or TBT measures to the WTO, in each case adducing one of 
six motives for the measure (these data do not have a bilateral) dimension.   
 
In their sample, 260 products have a coverage ratio above 50%. The most 
frequent barrier is “technical barriers” (i.e product-specific characteristics) with 
protection of health the most cited motive (human, followed by animal and 
plant). For 20 products, less than 5 countries impose a measure on that product, 
perhaps an indicator of a protectionist intent for those country-product pairs.   
 
Across OECD importing countries, there is a large variance in coverage ratios (for 
example, Japan has a coverage ratio of 23% while Australia, Mexico, New 
Zealand, Norway and the US have coverage ratios above 50%. When using the 
coverage indicator, developing countries are the most affected while it is 
developed countries when the ranking is by number of products affected.   
 
Gravity-based estimates at the HS-4 level for OECD countries indicate that, after 
controlling for others correlates of bilateral trade, each one of three indicators 
(dummy variable, frequency index or AVE) reduces significantly bilateral 
imports.  When disaggregating exporters into three groups (OECD, DCs and 
LDCs), they find that OECD exports are more significantly affected by tariffs than 
DCs or LDCs. When it comes to SPS and TBT measures, DCs and LDCs export 
volumes to OECD countries are negatively correlated with the index particularly 
when it comes to export to EU markets who notify fewer SPS and TBT measures 
than other OECD countries (except Korea and Turkey). At the subsector level 
(HS-2), they find statistically significant negative coefficients for one third of the 
sectors, and statistically significant positive coefficients for another third, the 
remainder being insignificant. However, the results are sensitive to the choice of 
NTB measure (dummy variable vs. AVEs). In sum, the study suggests that SPS 
and TBT measures are more negatively correlated with the exports of DCs and 
LDCs exports to OECD markets.  
 
* Drawn from Disdier et al. (2008)  
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The second approach draws on the factor-endowment-based theories of 
trade focusing on the volume of trade at the product level. In that 
approach, the volume of aggregate trade is correlated with factor 
endowments, country characteristics, tariffs and various proxies of NTBs. 
While it has advantages for a study of the effects of NTMs at the product 
level, it too has drawbacks as idiosyncratic measurement errors, likely to 
cancel out at the aggregate level, will be magnified at the HS-6 product-
line level and relevant control variables are missing. Finally, the estimate 
of the price elasticity of demand for imports, which is essential for 
computing the AVE, will likely change in magnitude with the sample 
period. 
 
Subject to the doubtful quality of the data, the survey in our companion 
paper of the growing number of studies various data bases suggest: (i) 
NTM restrictiveness estimates based on an aggregate of ‘core’ NTMs are 
more restrictive than existing tariffs and, because of their export 
composition towards agricultural products, these ‘core’ NTMs limit 
market-access most for low-income countries; (ii) subject to the included 
controls, NTM indicators are systematically correlated negatively with 
bilateral trade volumes; (iii) harmonization of standards is trade 
enhancing; (iv) for single-NTM products (74% of tariff lines only have one 
NTM measure) have an AVE of around 40% which is higher than the tariff 
on the corresponding line; (v) the restrictiveness of technical regulations 
increases with income per capita.  
 
Results based on Country Cases Survey/Interview data bases 
 
First, we look at the World Bank study on thirteen countries (Cambodia, 
Chile, China, Indonesia, Korea, Laos, Mexico, Singapore, Thailand, 
Taiwan, Peru, Vietnam). Taken together, the thirteen case studies suggest 
that NTMs are particularly costly for agricultural products not only 
because the SPS standards vary across countries, but also because 
compliance costs related to certification are high as the necessary 
infrastructure to carry them out were found to be lacking in the countries 
in the sample. These costs are compounded by the cost-raising effects on 
perishables due to inefficient customs procedures. For manufactures, steel, 
chemicals, and plastics are often subject to Anti-dumping measures.  
Finally the interviews in the surveys indicate that arbitrariness and non-
transparency plague exporters to developing countries, be it with respect 
to customs procedures or product standards. For exporters of these 
developing countries to the EU, US and Japan, the major obstacle is the 
complexity and level of detail in the trade procedures. Stringent Rules of 
Origin are often perceived as a significant barrier.  
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For the 5 EAC countries, the task team (World Bank 2008b) presents the 
NTMs that apply to intra-EAC trade, with the broad categories organized 
as per the WTO inventory categorization which are ranked in a decreasing 
order of importance and based on the numbers of private sector 
complaints from their interviews in the 5 EAC economies. They obtain the 
following ranking: a) Customs and administrative entry and passage 
procedures; b) Government participation in trade and restrictive practices 
tolerated by it; c) Distribution restrictions; d) Specific limitations; e) 
Technical barriers to trade and f) Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary Measures. 
 
We turn now to the first results based on the UNCTAD/WTO (ITC) pilot 
study (only for the private sector data) described previously (and in Box 2). 
A2s well described in Mimouni et al. (2009), In January 2008, the ITC and 
the UNCTAD launched a joint 15-month pilot project for the collection and 
classification of data on NTMs in seven developing countries. In each 
country, among other activities, a company-level survey with 300 to 400 
face-to-face interviews was carried out in order to identify, at the product 
level, those measures that exporting companies perceive as barriers in 
their daily business, as well as the reasons why companies experience 
a measure as burdensome. The following analysis will be based on the 
survey results for five countries (Chile, the Philippines,Thailand,Tunisia, 
and Uganda). Results from the surveys in the five countries are reported in 
table 1.7 
 
 
Table 1. Non-tariff Measures experienced by exporting firms (i.e. declared 
as “Serious Obstacles to Trade”, % 
 
source : Mimouni et al. (2009), table 1 in section 1.6. 
 
 
While the sample is small, beyond the expected result that technical 
measures are the most important form of NTM (a result also evident from 
                                           
7 In May 2009 the UNCTAD and ITC conducted a follow-up survey to assess the impact of 
the financial crisis on NTMs measures in 5 out of the 7 pilot countries. The paper of 
Skorobogatova et al. (2009) summarizes the results. 
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the earlier data—see table 4 below), several patterns emerge suggesting 
variation across regions of destination (perhaps due in to the product 
composition of exports) .  From table 2, it is apparent that Thai exporters 
reported concerns about technical measures to trade, while Chileans faced 
licenses and quotas and the African countries expressed concerns about 
customs formalities and pre-shipment inspection.  
 
Figure 1, also drawn from their study, explores the possibility that NTM 
barriers vary across destination by reporting the average share of NTMs 
across destination for the seven most prevailing type of measure (because 
firms often reported several measures, per-firm averages were computed 
in a first step). Certification requirements are important regardless of 
destination. Not surprisingly, exporters face barriers related to customs 
formalities in Africa. This is not surprising since tariffs are a more 
important source of government revenue in that region, but also it is at the 
customs that rent-seeking activities will endogenously take place in the 
form of NTMs. In the absence of rent-seeking activities, one might argue 
that PSI might be warranted, but it is not at all clear that it fulfills its role 
(see Anson, Cadot and Olarreaga, 2006). So even in this straightforward 
case, it is not absolutely clear that this NTM is ‘actionable’, i.e. is welfare-
reducing. For exports destined to high-income countries, testing 
requirements represent an important obstacle for exporters. Two patterns 
emerge; (i) exporting to countries in the Africa, Latin America and 
Caribbean regions face more procedural barriers overall; (ii) for at least 
three countries (Chile, Thailand and Tunisia), barriers to regional 
destinations are highest; (iii) further results (not reported here) suggest 
that many of the problems reported by the firms surveyed relate to 
domestic barriers ranging from weak customs and administrative 
procedures as well a lack of local facilities and infrastructure. 
 
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2009.33 
 
 16 
Figure 1. Companies’ Perceptions of NTMs by Destination, % 
 
 
source :Mimouni et al. (2009), figure 1  in section 1.6. 
 
 
These patterns are informative, and useful, partly because they confirm 
some of the patterns emerging from the larger earlier data set where it is 
apparent that technical regulations represent the most frequent form of 
NTMs (see estimations obtained in our companion paper and reported in 
table 2 below). With a larger sample of countries comparisons to averages 
will be more meaningful. However, as already discussed in section 2, it will 
always remain a difficult task to interpret the implications of subjective 
statements. It may also be difficult to match the results from 
questionnaires administered to companies to the responses by firms.  
 
To learn more about the effects of NTMs, not only case studies must 
complement the econometric estimates, but these studies must go beyond 
interviews and rely on more systematic in-depth data gathering on 
compliance costs.  This is illustrated in the commodity-chain studies 
summarized in box 4. These results confirm that there is no substitute for 
sector-specific expertise and that it is difficult to interpret the results from 
perceptions expressed in ordinal rankings in interviews. 
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Box 4: 
Food Safety and Agricultural Standards* 
Fresh and processed fruits and vegetables, fish, meat, nuts, and spices account for 
over 50% of agricultural food exports of developing countries. A recent study of 
commodity chains for fish, horticulture, livestock products, nuts and spices in 9 
low and middle-income countries reached several generalizable conclusions. (i) 
SPS constraints include measures imposed by the private sector that are often 
more stringent than those of the public sector. (ii) In countries with weak 
institutions and lack of overall competitiveness (administrative financial and 
other weaknesses), these measures may force exit, but for countries with adaptive 
capacity, these stricter standards provide a stimulus for investments in supply-
chain modernization resulting in more profitable long-term trade. (ii) the 
complexity of the standards setting for high-value products are likely to increase, 
especially within the private sector, leading to package together safety, quality, 
environmental and social standards implying that developing-country 
stakeholders should participate in the standards-setting process through 
international organizations, bilateral discussions, or membership in private 
bodies. (iii) A great diversity in the operative ‘rules of the game’ subsist in spite a 
move in the same broad direction, with regulatory systems entailing a mix of old 
and new requirements that reflect largely different perceptions of risk, scientific 
traditions and climatic/geographic traditions so that it is difficult to ascertain the 
cases when standards are protectionist in intent. 
The research also shows that compliance strategies to cope with SPS have been 
successful in many middle-income countries and that coping strategies should 
move beyond a pure public sector approach to include the private sector. 
Potential benefits of standards compliance are long-term (there are economies of 
scale and scope), often intangible (price premiums are not always paid for ‘safe’ 
and ‘sustainable’ products) and the benefits often accrue to others. In many 
instances, the researchers were able to document the low costs of compliance for 
those that chose to comply. In many instances the bulk of compliance costs were 
fixed and often less than 5% of the annual value of exports. The research 
concludes that for the large array of high-value commodity chains examined, 
costes were less than assumed, especially relative to the value of exports.  
 
* World Bank (2005) 
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4.  Welfare Effects of NTMs  
 
If measuring the effects of NTMs on trade flows is difficult, with the 
exception of QRs, VERs and minimum prices whose objectives are to 
protect domestic industries, detecting their welfare effects is even harder 
because the measures are complex and hence not easily quantifiable. Most 
importantly, the NTMs typically have several objectives, with protection a 
potential objective to be detected since it is hidden. Even in the case of 
distortionary NTBs, i.e. measures that do not address a market failure such 
as externalities or asymmetric information, a unified approach to measure 
their impact does not exist. Typically, measurement is in partial 
equilibrium at the product level. The analysis then attempts to separate 
out three effects: (i) the regulatory protection effect that provides rents to 
domestic producers; (ii) the supply-shift effect reflecting increased costs 
for foreign, and sometimes domestic, suppliers; (iii) a demand-shift effect 
which takes into account that the regulation may enhance demand with 
new information or by reducing an externality. 
 
The three following example help illustrate the difficulties at 
quantification. The first illustrates the difficulty in drawing the welfare 
implications of SPS measures for agricultural products. The second on 
standards in electronic products applied by the EU, shows that 
harmonization of standards increases trade, and is likely to be welfare-
increasing. The third, on rules of origin in PTAs illustrates that these 
measures are prone to capture and hence are likely to be welfare-reducing  
 
Suppose a country imposes an SPS measure, and one uses a frequency or 
coverage measure to approximate the effects of the measure.  First, the 
indicator used for the measure (usually a binary variable)  does not capture 
the potential deterrent effect the measure may have on exporters’ pricing 
and quantity decisions (this is not a problem with a tariff whose objective 
is just to reduce imports, and perhaps to raise revenue).  Second to get the 
information on the relative value of the affected product, one would want 
to compute the coverage index on the value of imports that would have 
occurred in the absence of the measure, which is unobservable.  Finally, 
when one observes the outcome resulting from the adoption of the 
measure, one is not sure if it is the result of a supply and/or a demand shift 
(the SPS measure could be informative as consumers learn about the 
product’s characteristics perhaps via required labeling, in which case the 
demand curve would shift out).  It is not surprising then that the results 
from the bilateral estimates at HS-4 level reported in box 3 are unstable 
and sensitive to the choice of indicator of NTM. And even if the results 
were stable one would have difficulty drawing welfare implications without 
being informed subject to the SPS: for example,  a decrease in imports of a 
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hazardous product following the imposition of an NTM is not welfare 
reducing as is a reduction in imports following the imposition of a QR, a 
VER or a tariff. 
 
The effects of product standards on manufactures are also difficult to 
ascertain since they can have a dual impact on costs. On the one hand they 
may impose additional costs on exporters who may have to adopt products 
to the required standards in the importing country. Moreover, a producer 
wishing to export to several markets may be confronted to idiosyncratic 
standards specific to each market (in electronics, the EU imposes around 
1800 standards, of which two-thirds are international common standards, 
see Portugal-Perez, Reyes and Wilson, 2009).  To these costs, must be 
added certification costs.  On the other hand, product standards can 
reduce the exporter’s information costs if they convey information on 
industrial requirements or consumer tastes in the importing country. 
Portugal-Perez et al. show that internationally-harmonized standards are 
associated with expanded EU imports of electronics while European 
standards not harmonized are associated with a lower effect on imports, in 
some cases a negative effect. Taken together, the results suggest that 
harmonization of standards increases welfare. 
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Box 5 
The Capture of Rules of Origin by Private Interests* 
RoO in PTAs have two components: a small set of regime-wide and a large set of 
product-specific rules of origin (over 500 different ones in the EU system), 
typically defined at the HS-6 level of disaggregation.  Together, both rules are 
intended to insure sufficient transformation. The EU and the US who are the 
main instigators of PTAs have rules that feature a large list of criteria, including 
technical requirements such as the “triple transformation” requirement in textiles 
and apparel, which requires apparel to be woven from originating fabric and 
yarn. Criteria also include exceptions (making them more stringent) and 
allowances (making them less stringent).  The US relies more heavily on changes 
of tariff classification, though often in combination with other criteria while the 
EU relies more heavily on the value content and wholly obtained criteria.  
 
To find out how stringent these rules researchers have constructed ordinal 
measures of overall restrictiveness to indicate that product-specific rules with a 
greater number of conditions to be met are more restrictive. Research based on 
preference uptake under NAFTA and the EU system of preferences have shown 
that after controlling for the extent of preferences, utilization rates are lower for 
products with restrictive RoO, that restrictiveness of RoO increase with the 
preferential margin. Detailed analysis of Mexican exports of clothing to the US at 
the HS-8 level shows that 1/3 of the price rise from sales to the US under 
preferential access goes to compensate for higher intermediate costs and the price 
of intermediates sold by the US to Mexico rose under NAFTA. In North-South 
PTAs, the Southern partner in effect has to buy inefficient goods from the 
Northern partner to “pay for” preferential access. In sum, the restrictiveness of 
RoO has been found to go beyond the levels that would be justified to prevent 
trade deflection suggesting a capture by special interest groups. 
 
Simplification of RoO accompanied by harmonization across PTAs (via the 
multilateralization of the rules) would represent a significant step towards 
reducing an actionable NTM. For example, LDCs could be exempted from having 
to prove origin when preferential margins are less than 3-5%, and single change 
of tariff classification, or a uniform value content rule could be adopted. In 
addition to reducing compliance costs, such simplification cum uniformization 
would reduce administrative costs and free customs officials (according to 
surveys, customs officials estimate they spend close to 1/3 of their time on 
checking compliance with origin requirements) for other tasks such as trade 
facilitation.   
 
Following the Hong-Kong Ministerial declaration stating that developed 
countries should “…ensure that preferential rules of origin applicable to imports 
from LDCs should are transparent and simple, and contributing to facilitating 
market access (paragraph (b) in annex F of the declaration), LDCs have circulated 
a paper (TN/CTD/”/30) suggesting a combination of value addition and local 
content criteria. This is clearly an area in which LDCs could press harder for a 
simplification.  
 
* Cadot et al. eds (2006) and Cadot and de Melo (2008) summarize the literature.  
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Finally, consider Rules of origin (RoO), necessary to prevent trade-
deflection in FTAs, i.e. to prevent imports from entering the zone via the 
country with the lowest tariff.  Even though FTAs are discriminatory in 
intent, RoO have the legitimate objective of preventing the unwanted 
extension of preferences to out-of-bloc producers which would erode the 
value of those preferences to eligible producers (in North-South FTAs, 
RoO are also sometimes justified on “developmental” grounds as they can 
help foster the emergence of integrated manufacturing activities in 
Southern partners). 
 
RoO are notified to the WTO and figure in the NAMA-based WTO 
inventory of NTMs measures as item F in Part II (Customs and 
Administrative Entry Procedures). Detailed inventories of RoO used by the 
EU and US indicate several hundred different RoO defined at the HS-6 
level. In North-South FTAs, RoO technical requirements (e.g. the double 
transformation requirement in the production of clothing) coupled with 
the regional value content criterion have to be met to qualify for 
preferential access in the Northern partner’s market. The Southern 
producers are then forced to source relatively inefficient intermediate 
goods locally or in Northern partners (compared to most price-competitive 
sources in, say, Asia).  
 
Digging into the maze indicates that RoO are more restrictive for products 
with high preference margins. The RoO also end up reducing the value of 
preferences (compounding preference erosion in particular for Least 
Developed Countries).  Thus, by design via the bargaining and lobbying 
power of the Northern firms, RoO have been captured by producers and 
end up as a way to “export protection” (see box 5 for details). Clearly, RoO 
are an NTM whose initial intent was not protection, but which have been 
captured by protectionist groups and an actionable NTB (see box 5 for 
measures that would reduce these costs).  
 
 
5.  Approaches to Eliminating NTMs  
Given the difficulty at classifying NTMs, a practical approach is to follow 
the World Bank (2008a) and use the four principles required of NTMs by 
the WTO (i.e. transparency, non discrimination, existence of a scientific 
basis in the case of SPS measures and absence of better alternatives). 8 
This is the approach used in the classification of table 2 which describes 
the main characteristics of WTO-verified NTMs. Actually, following the 
ASEAN analysis, we examine in table 2 every identified non-tariff measure 
                                           
8 This is the approach used by ASEAN in their approach at removing NTMs. Using the 
WTO classification also makes sense if one is looking into the future of the WTS which is 
more likely to be concerned with marginal adaptation of existing rules than creating or 
changing drastically existing rules. 
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in light of the four WTO criteria above and propose, when available, the 
ad-valorem tariff equivalent as estimated in Carrère and De Melo (2009). 
The last column also suggests measures that should be replaced by 
transparent and non-discriminatory measures which nevertheless achieve 
the same policy goals. 
The difficulty is that in a number of cases an NTM can be WTO-compatible 
but also discriminatory or it may create an obstacle to trade due to its 
implementation. This why the new UNCTAD/WTO (ITC) classification 
also introduces the concept of “procedural obstacles” which refers to issues 
related to the process of application of an NTM, rather than to the measure 
itself (see box 2). It was decided that information on problems or other 
excessive burdens related to implementation of NTMs were to be collected 
through survey data under the broad term of procedural obstacles (see 
section 2). But for the moment, such information is not available on a 
cross-section basis and thus we continue to refer to the best criteria 
currently available, i.e the WTO-compatibility criterion. 
As shown in Carrère and De Melo (2009) where a tally is taken of the 
frequency of the main NTMs from the UNCTAD TRAINS data base, 
technical regulations (often in the form of SPS measures) is the most 
frequently used NTM (probably followed by RoO if only because  of the 
growing number of PTAs around the world).  
In table 2, the most difficult NTMs to characterize are the technical 
regulations relating to sanitary measures (for the protection of human 
beings and animals) and the phytosanitary measures (for the protection of 
plant health). To be WTO-compatible, SPS measures should be 
harmonized to the standards guidelines and recommendations of the 
‘three sisters’ (CODEX, IOE, IPPC) with LDCs having S&D treatment.  The 
difficulties involved with SPS are evident from the relatively large number 
of complaints related to the DSU. 9 
 
                                           
9  As of December 2008, 35 violations to the SPS agreement had been reported with 10 
panels set up to examine 11 complaints, but few developing countries have figured as 
either complainants or respondents in the disputes reaching the panel stage.  
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Table 2. A Classification of NTMs  
 
Type of NTM Objective 
Potential for non 
transparent and  
discriminatory application 
Scientific 
basis 
Tariff 
AVE a) 
possible 
levels of 
negoc. b) 
Alternative measure that can achieve 
objective in less distortive manner 
1400 –Tariff quota 
duties 
Protection 
None since based on 
predetermined criteria such as 
product type and amount but 
discriminates between products 
None 
 National(N) 
Regional(R) 
Multilateral(M) 
N/R 
Tariffs 
2200 – Additional 
charges 
Revenue 
None since transparent and 
applied uniformly on imports 
None 
 N/R Uniform tax on both domestic and imported 
products 
2300 – Internal 
taxes and charges 
levied on imports 
Revenue or to cover 
administrative costs 
None since transparent and 
applied uniformly on imports 
None 
 N/R 
Uniform tax on both domestic and imported 
products 
3100 – 
Administrative  
pricing 
Protection through 
price control 
Non-transparent basis for 
price; discriminates between 
products 
None 
36.7%  N 
Tariffs 
3400 – Antidumping 
measures 
Protection through 
price control 
None since transparent, 
covered by WTO Agreement 
None 
 N/R 
Remedy already provided for under WTO 
rules 
4300 – Restrictive 
official foreign 
exchange allocation 
Control outflow of 
foreign exchange 
Transparent but may 
discriminate between importers 
None 
 N Uniform surcharge on imports, or tax on all 
foreign exchange transactions or some 
otherform of capital control 
5100 – Automatic 
licensing 
Monitor imports None since freely granted None 
 N Ex-post reporting of imports based on 
customs entries 
6100 – Non- 
automatic licensing 
Protection through 
quantity control 
Can be nontransparent, 
unpredictable, arbitrary, 
discriminatory 
None 
38.1%  N 
Tariffs 
6200 – Quotas 
Protection through 
quantity control 
Basis for quota may be non-
transparent; discriminates 
between products 
None 
42.6%  N 
Tariffs 
6300 – Prohibitions 
Protection through 
quantity control; also 
for public health and 
safety, security, 
environmental,  
religious, moral 
reasons 
Transparent but discriminates 
between products 
Covers sensitive 
products, to 
protect health, 
safety, morals, 
security, 
environment 
46.4%  N/R/M 
First establish that prohibition is not related 
to an SPS measure; Tariffs if rationale is 
protection; domestic tax or regulation of 
consumption regardless of source if for 
technical reasons 
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Table 2 (continued). A Classification of NTMs  
 
 
Type of NTM Objective 
Potential for non 
transparent and  
discriminatory application 
Scientific 
basis 
Tariff 
AVE a) 
possible 
levels of 
negoc. b) 
Alternative measure that can achieve 
objective in less distortive manner 
6700 – Enterprise- 
specific restrictions 
Selective protection 
Procedures and their application 
can be non-transparent and 
discriminate between products 
None 
 N/R 
Tariffs; fiscal incentives given to selected 
sectors 
7100 – Single 
channel for imports 
Fiscal, economic, or 
social 
Transparent but discriminates 
between  products 
None 
39.8%  N 
Tax if fiscal; incentives if economic; tax or 
controls on domestic consumption, or 
operation of buffer stock if social 
8100 – Technical 
regulations 
Protect health, safety, 
environment, security 
Transparent administration and 
equal application on domestic 
and imported products is likely; 
however, discriminates against 
subjected products 
Yes for health, 
safety, 
environment or 
security reasons 
43.3%  
 
N/R At national level, comply with standards in 
CODEX, IPPC and IOE; at regional level; 
harmonization and  mutual recognition of 
standards as in the EU and to a lesser extent 
the ASEAN 
8200 – Pre-shipment 
inspection 
 
Protect government 
revenue 
 
Basis for quality, quantity or 
price evaluation can be non- 
transparent; discriminates 
between products and origins 
unless comprehensive 
 
None 
 
 N 
Risk management at Customs with post-entry 
audit 
 
Customs and 
Administrative 
procedures 
(Rules of Origin) 
Prevent transhipment 
Usually multiple and Complex, 
but non-discriminatory 
Ambiguous 
 N/R/M 
Simplify multiple  PSRO and use a uniform 
criterion across broad category of sectors 
Source: Adapted from World Bank report (2008a) – table 3 page 25 
a) estimates obtained from the companion paper Carrère and De Melo (2009) 
b) Classification by the authors 
.
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Next, whether NTMs are to be dealt with at the national, regional, or 
multilateral level, a sensible approach would be to classify them further as: 
- NTMs unnecessary (such as automatic licensing) 
- NTMs potentially non transparent and discriminatory (RoO) 
- NTMs that are transparent but discriminatory (selected technical 
regulations) 
- NTMs that are transparent and apply to both domestic and imported 
goods could be retained (unless they are welfare-reducing). 
 
Based on this classification, elimination could then proceed in the order 
classified above, starting with automatic licensing and other unnecessary 
NTMs, then proceeding with the others.  
 
Two approaches at eliminating NTMS have been/can be pursued:  
(i) The vertical approach which would identify the NTMs measures 
which are most welfare-reducing. This is for instance the strategy 
proposed in World Bank (2008b) for the EAC. NTMs are identified in 
function of how much they restrain Intra-EAC trade and of their political 
economic complexity.  Hence, as reported in figure 2, 4 quadrants are 
defined (from A to D).  
Figure 2:  
Categorization of NTMs in EAC: a ranking by the ease of action for 
removal 
 
Source: World Bank 2008b, figure 3.1 page 16 
Given capacity constraints in the regional economic community and its 
member governments, EAC wants to first target action on these first 
quadrant (A and B) reflecting NTMs that are both relatively 
noncontroversial for EAC-wide consensus building for removal and have a 
negative impact on trade (see the World Bank report on EAC, 2008b, 
pages 15-16). The intra-EAC trade would benefit more from EAC’s 
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prioritizing those NTMs located in quadrant B during the preparation of 
action plans for implementation of reduction/removal.   
 
(ii) the horizontal approach which identifies priority sectors and then 
eliminates NTMs plaguing these sectors;. The ASEAN approach at 
eliminating NTMs chose the horizontal approach, identifying 11 priority 
sectors (see box 6) and classifying the NTMs into Red, Amber and Green 
boxes according to their restrictiveness, regulatory objectives and WTO 
consistency - see the discussion on the criteria for identifying priority 
sectors in World Bank (2008a, p. 24-6).10  
 
Box 6 
Priority Sector Criterion* 
 
In 2004, ASEAN singled out eleven sectors as priority integration sectors 
(independent of the NTM process), based on their great potential for: (a) 
combining the economic strengths of ASEAN members for regional advantage, 
(b) facilitating and promoting intra-ASEAN investments, (c) attracting and 
retaining manufacturing and other activities within the region, (d) promoting 
outsourcing within ASEAN, (e) developing “made in ASEAN” products and 
services.” These priority sectors include nine goods sectors (agro-based products, 
fisheries, healthcare, rubber, wood, textiles, information technology, electronics, 
and automotive) and two service sectors (air-transport and tourism). 
 
The ASEAN Secretariat identified that reducing the incidence of NTMs in these 
critical sectors is important for the development of these sectors. This is 
particularly relevant since an analysis by the ASEAN Secretariat (ASEAN 
Program for Regional Integration Support, 2005) shows that more often than 
not, the products with high NTM incidence fall under one of the eleven priority 
sectors: NTMs seem to be particularly prevalent in electrical equipment, organic 
chemicals, motor vehicles, tobacco, cereals, sugar, cosmetics, beverages, 
cereal/flour/milk preparations, edible fruit and nuts, pharmaceuticals, cocoa, 
dairy products, coffee/tea/spices, live animals, vegetables, meat/fish 
preparations, vegetable preparations, waste from the food industry, seeds, live 
trees, meat and edible offal. 
 
* extract from the World Bank report, 2008a, page 24 
 
                                           
10 Based on the combined insights regarding sectoral importance, trade restrictiveness, 
regulatory objectives and WTO consistency of a given measure, ASEAN has proposed to 
subsequently classify NTMs into the following categories: 
a) Red Box: NTMs maintained on products traded in ASEAN which would require 
immediate elimination; 
b) Amber Box: NTMs which could not be clearly identified or classified as barriers; and 
c) Green Box: NTMs which could be justified and should be maintained. 
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Either approach may be adopted but the examples in section 3 show that it 
is difficult to estimate the welfare effects of NTMs which is necessary 
whether a horizontal or vertical strategy at NTM is pursued.  
 
Elimination of NTMs can be pursued: (i) at the national level; (ii) at the 
regional level in the context of an Regional Integration Agreement in 
which the country participates; (iii) Multilateral, as in e.g. the Trade 
Facilitation negotiations at the WTO. 
 
(i) National.  When pursued at the national level, there is no concern 
about delegation of authority to a supra-national level.  Since today the 
vast majority of DCs and LDCs are involved in multiple reciprocal PTAs, 
the goal should be harmonization and recognition at the regional level so 
that the RIA is ‘deep’ and hence welfare-enhancing for all members. 
 
Mexico presents an interesting national program of NTM elimination. As 
described by Cadot (2009), the Mexican experience highlights the benefits 
that come from the streamlining of NTMs when it is part of a broader 
regulatory-reform agenda. The number of licenses, permits and other 
information requirements in the commerce and transport sectors, for 
instance, was cut from about one thousand in 1995 to fewer than 400 in 
2000 and the Economic Deregulation Unit (UDE), created as early as 
1989, reviewed over 500 regulatory proposals between 1995 and 2000. All 
in all, about 90% of Mexico’s regulatory framework was affected by the 
process.  
 
Box 7 
A roadmap for NTM streamlining based on the Mexican experience* 
 
The review of the Mexican experience suggests that the NTM/regulatory 
improvement toolbox has essentially four elements, each of which can play a role 
separately or in combination with the others: 
 
1. A consistent and mutually-reinforcing reform agenda, and a strong and 
permanent political anchor, such as a binding trade agreement (like NAFTA)  
2. International support in the form of technical assistance to the regulatory-
improvement body, and international (typically regional) cooperation in the 
elimination of NTM;  
3. A credible institutional setup revolving around a strong oversight body with 
independence, competence, and high-level political support.  
4. Engagement of national administrations, in particular middle-level civil 
servants, in a Regulatory Impact Assessments process for new regulations and 
NTMs, taken seriously and used in conjunction with systematic exposure and 
consultation with stakeholders; 
 
* extract from Cadot, 2009, page 9 
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(ii) Regional. To be successful, NTM removal at the regional level 
requires some delegation of authority to the supra-national level. The case 
of the EU summarized in box 8 is the example of the deepest form of NTM 
removal among sovereign States. However, other efforts have met with 
some degree of success.  
 
Some examples in developing countries 
APEC adopted a Trade Facilitation Plan in 1995 aiming to reduce 
transaction costs for businesses by 5% by 2006. As detailed in World Bank 
(2008a), the ASEAN has implemented a coherent strategy for overcoming 
NTMs. Even if the elimination of NTMs has been moving more slowly that 
tariff reduction (partly due to difficult measurement issues), the ASEAN 
roadmap for integration specifies that NTMs are to be eliminated by 2010 
for the ASEAN6, and 2018 for Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam.  It 
is also noteworthy that AFTA which includes ASEAN members has 
adopted the simplest origin requirement to meet origin (40 regional value 
content or wholly obtained) for all products, which is significantly less 
restrictive than the more complex system of RoO adopted by virtually all 
other PTAs.11  
Several ASEAN regional initiatives have been already eliminated some 
NTMs through the implementation, for instance, of the new ASEAN 
harmonized tariff nomenclature at the customs level in 2002, the full 
harmonization to international standards for some TBT dealing with 
consumer health and safety for 20 priory products in 2003,  and for some 
standards with respect to electrical safety aspects in 2004. ASEAN has also 
followed the horizontal approach described above.12 
 
Another noteworthy regional initiative is the one of the EAC, already 
described above. EAC wants to consider the elimination of NTMs within 
the context of its evolving common trade policy (see World Bank 2008b).13  
 
Why a regional approach to the elimination of NTMs ?  
Two main reasons to pursue a regional approach emerge from the regional 
and country experiences previously discussed: 
- Some NTMs on intra-regional trade can be eliminated. These 
include: (i) border checks and other customs formalities on regional 
goods; (ii) harmonized legislation on health, safety or 
environmental protection. Examples of elimination of this kind of 
                                           
11  See Cadot et al. (2007).  
12 See details on the ASEAN website and in the ASEAN program for Regional Integration 
Support (2005). 
13 discussion by the EAC Council of Ministers on the EAC-wide NTMs and course of action 
to be pursued in analyzing and reducing /removing them is summarized in the EAC Trade 
Committee Report (February 2008). 
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NTMs can be found in the EU case (see box 8), the ASEAN case 
(with for instance the Agreement on Mutual Recognition 
Arrangements – MRA - intended as “agreements between two or 
more parties to mutually recognize or accept some or all aspects of 
one another’s conformity assessment results”),  or again the EAC 
case discussed above.  
 
- Some NTMs on multilateral trade can be alleviated thanks to a 
supra-national delegation of authority. This is obvious through for 
instance the Single Action Plan of the EU on Public-Sector 
purchases of non-domestic origin; or the AFTA initiative to adopt 
the simplest origin requirement to meet origin, or the ASEAN 
harmonization to international standards for some TBTs dealing 
with consumer health and safety; Or the EAC that wants to consider 
the elimination of the NTMs within the context of its evolving 
common trade policy. This advantage of “external or supra-national 
commitment” is also clearly significant in the Mexican case where 
NAFTA provided a strong impetus for NTM streamlining in Mexico 
by providing a political anchor to the domestic reform agenda (see 
Cadot 2009). 
 
 
 (iii) Multilateral.  Little progress has been made so far under the Doha 
Round except for Trade Facilitation. Making trade easier or “Trade 
Facilitation” (TF) as it has come to be called is an integral part of reforms 
aimed at reducing trade costs (simplification of trade procedures, 
harmonization of commercial rules and transparent information and 
procedures as well as the recourse to new technologies allowing trade 
promotion and more secure means of payment). Indeed, negotiations on 
Trade Facilitation are the only item among the Singapore to have been 
included in the “July package” of 2004 and to attract relative consensus 
across countries. This consensus is explainable by the sharp rise in intra-
industry trade, the rising exchange of intermediate goods, and the 
verticalization of production in the supply chains that has accompanied 
the delocalization of activities from developed to developing The TF 
negotiations which are to deal with articles V (‘transit freedom’ which is 
extremely important for LDCs, 16 of the 50 being landlocked), VIII (‘fees 
and formalities Related to the Import and export’, i.e. red-tape) and X 
(‘publication and application of rules related to international trade’). A 
second reason for the consensus in carrying out TF negotiations is that the 
elimination of the red-tape creates relatively few rents and these measures 
are not easily subject to capture by officials. In spite of significant fixed 
costs for LDCs (which could be borne by technical assistance), it is 
expected that significant market access and increased competitiveness will 
be achieved by the TF negotiations. 
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Box 8 
The Elimination of NTMs in the EU 
The single market of the EU is the most comprehensive example of economic 
integration and elimination of NTBs based on the three principles of (i) non-
discrimination; (ii) mutual recognition; (iii) Community legislation to ensure the 
functioning of the common market. The so-called four ‘freedoms’ that cover the 
movement for goods, persons, services and capital is the result of the abolition of 
customs duties, QRs, and measures having equivalent effect to customs duties 
and QRs. Measures having equivalent effect have been defined by the European 
Court of Justice as “All trading rules enacted by Member States which are capable 
of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade 
are considered as having an effect equivalent to QRs.” Some sixteen measures 
have been identified as having equivalent effects. The EC also prohibits all types 
of trade remedies which include Anti-dumping, safeguards and countervailing 
measures. In addition, under Mutual Recognition, a Member State may not 
prohibit the sale of goods lawfully produced in another Member State (the 1979 
Cassis de Dijon Case). New law (harmonized legislation) was adopted when 
existing rules (mostly on health, safety or environmental protection) differed too 
much across Members and starting in 1985 physical barriers (border checks and 
customs formalities) were eliminated. 
In spite of substantial supra-national delegation of authority to the European 
Commission, progress in some areas having  equivalent effects like public sector 
purchases of non-domestic origin were slow, so the Single Action Plan was 
adopted in 1997 to speed up the necessary integration of the Single Market with a 
scoreboard of implementation put in place. The Action Plan also dealt with 
formal infringement procedures. If the country fails to comply after the 
procedure, the European Court of Justice has the power to impose penalty 
payments and take away privileges under the trader from the country as a last 
resort 
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6. Conclusions 
 
Estimates of trade costs are high so the issue is to detect where these trade 
costs come from.  The literature has shown that trade flows are sensitive to 
both NTMs and BTB measures, some estimates suggesting that BTB 
measures are higher than NTM measures. Much progress is forthcoming 
on selected BTB measure via initiatives on Trade Facilitation at the 
multilateral level. This paper concentrates on NTMs: detecting their 
effects, and finding out if the reduction in trade flows is welfare reducing. 
 
With the elimination of t bulk of QRs, VERs and other ‘traditional’ welfare-
reducing NTMs, the remaining NTMS are technical barriers to trade. 
Examples in the paper show that it is difficult to detect when these 
regulations are ‘actionable’, i.e. welfare reducing because their intent is not 
easy to detect. This is particularly the case for SPS measures for which is it 
difficult to ascertain if they have protectionist intent. In the case of Rules 
of Origin which have the legitimate objective of preventing trade 
deflection, in practice, they have been captured by protectionist interest 
groups and are more clearly actionable. 
 
Proceeding forward requires first a classification of NTMs as to their  
usefulness regardless of intent (for example automatic licensing can be  
removed) then figuring out if they are discriminatory against imports or 
have a welfare cost in which case they should be removed. Some countries 
have used a vertical approach (identifying priority sectors as in ASEAN) 
and others a horizontal (eliminating NTMs in sectors where consensus will 
be easiest to achieve as in the EAC) approach. As discussed in the text, 
each has its advantage and the appropriateness depends on circumstances  
The sequencing of removal has varied across countries and depends on the 
context.  
 
Another dimension is whether removal is best pursued nationally, 
regionally or multilaterally. Here too, there are differences in experience 
across countries and regions. Some NTMs can be removed unilaterally but, 
given that most countries are engaged in RIAs, a regional approach would 
be preferable since it brings into focus the gains from harmonization 
across countries. Multilateral approaches are also desirable but more 
difficult to achieve because countries are hesitant to give up the necessary 
sovereignty to move forward. 
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Annex1 
 
Data Bases on NTMs and Trade Facilitation 
 
This annex describes the main data bases on NTMS and trade facilitation 
available. Table A1.1 describes the agency responsible for each data base, 
what is in the data base, the URL to access the data base (when it exists) 
and the e-mail address for inquiries.14 Follow some comments on these 
databases.  
 
We describe first two data bases dealing with estimates of the combination 
of all NTMs. This is followed by a brief description of the main NTM-
specific databases. 15 
 
UNCTAD TRAINS – WITS. The main international datasets on NTMs can 
be found in the UNCTAD TRAINS data base (through the WITS software). 
The WITS includes frequency data (i.e. it indicates whether a country has a 
particular NTM at the Harmonized System 6-digit (HS-6) classification 
level. These NTMs (often referred to as “core” NTMs are described in table 
A1.2. This classification corresponds to UNCTAD’s Coding System of Trade 
Control Measures). Exact information included in WITS is reported in 
table A1.3. It is this data base that has been used to compute “frequency 
ratios” or “trade coverage ratios” of NTMs across countries and products 
(see for instance Bora, Kuwahara and Laird, 2002).   
 
WITS covers theoretically 165 countries (counting European Union as one 
country) with time span from 1988 to present. However, there are a lot of 
missing values. In fact, NTM data are actually available for around 100 
countries, and not always for recent years.  A further difficulty is 
interpreting the cells with a zero since it may not necessarily reflect the 
absence of an NTM for the corresponding country/product, but rather 
missing data. When using WITS data, if possible, one should complement 
this with data from other sources (as in e.g. Kee et al., 2009, who complete 
WITS data with information provided by the WTO’s trade policy review 
and by the EU standard’s database). 
 
                                           
14  This table is taken from the more exhaustive description distributed at a recent two-
day meeting “Data Day at the WTO” available at  
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/data_day_may09_e/brochure_dataday_ma
y09_e.pdf 
15 See the survey in Annex 1 table A1.1. Some of the databases described in this subsection 
are discussed in more details in a very informative note titled “trade and market access 
data for policy makers” and available at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/data_day_may09_e/brochure_dataday_ma
y09_e.pdf  
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Table A1.1 Summary table listing the databases on NTMs and Trade  Facilitation. 
 
 Organization  Title  Section  URL  Contact  
ITC  Market Access Map 
(MacMap)  
Tariffs and trade  www.macmap.org    marketanalysis@intrace
n.org  
UNCTAD  TRAINS  Tariffs and trade; 
non-tariff measures  
http://unctad-trains.org   trains@unctad.org  
World Bank 
 UNCTAD  
World Integrated Trade 
Solution (WITS)  
Tariffs and trade  http://wits.worldbank.org/wit
sweb   
wits@worldbank.org  
World Bank 
Brandeis Univ 
Global Antidumping 
Database  
Non-tariff measures  http://people.brandeis.edu/~c
bown/global_ad/   
cbown@brandeis.edu  
WTO  Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures – Information 
Management System (SPS-
IMS)  
Non-tariff 
measures, 
Agriculture specific 
issues  
http://spsims.wto.org/   spsims@wto.org  
World Bank  Overall Trade 
Restrictiveness Indices  
Non-tariff measures  http://econ.worldbank.org/W
BSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/
EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentM
DK:21085342~pagePK:642148
25~piPK:64214943~theSitePK
:469382,00.htm    
World Bank  
OECD  TF indicators (project)  Trade facilitation  Not available  
World Bank  Doing Business database  Trade facilitation  http://www.doingbusiness.org   rru@worldbank.org  
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Table A1.1 Summary table listing the databases on NTMs and Trade Facilation (Continued). 
 
Organization  Title  Section  URL  Contact  
World Bank  Logistics Performance 
Indicators  
Trade facilitation  http://www.worldbank.org/lpi   tradefacilitation@worl
dbank.org  
World Bank  World Trade Indicators  Trade facilitation  http://web.worldbank.org/WB
SITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/T
RADE/0,,contentMDK:213930
40~pagePK:210058~piPK:210
062~theSitePK:239071,00.ht
ml    
ryatawara@worldbank
.org  
World Economic 
Forum  
Global Enabling Trade 
Report  
Trade facilitation  http://www.weforum.org/en/i
nitiatives/gcp/GlobalEnabling
TradeReport/index.htm   
World Economic 
Forum  
 
Source: WTO background document “Trade and Market access Data for Policy Makers” available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/data_day_may09_e/brochure_dataday_may09_e.pdf  
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World Bank Overall Trade Restrictiveness Indices. This data base contains 
several indices computed by Kee et al. (2009). It includes an Overall Trade 
restrictiveness Index (ORTI) (an aggregate of tariff and non-tariff 
measures).16  The data base also includes an estimate of the ad-valorem 
equivalent (AVE) of “core” NTBs at the country/HS6 product categories 
level.   
 
Global Antidumping Database This database hosts recently collected 
publicly and freely available detailed data on twenty-five (as of the 
completion of version 5.0) different national governments’ use of the 
antidumping (AD) trade policy instrument, as well as all WTO members’ 
use of safeguard (SG) measures, China-specific transitional safeguard 
(CSG) measures, and most of the global users of countervailing duties 
(CVD) through 2008. 
 
WTO Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures – Information Management 
System (SPS-IMS)  The SPS-IMS provides access to WTO-related 
information on food safety and animal and plant health (sanitary and 
phytosanitary or SPS measures).17 The system allows users to track and 
obtain information on SPS measures that Member governments have 
notified to the WTO, on specific trade concerns raised in the SPS 
Committee, on documents of the WTO's Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures Committee, and on Member governments' enquiry points and 
notification authorities. 
 
EU Standards database The EU Standards Database18 collates European 
standards for agricultural products and textiles/clothing over the period 
1995-2003, and maps them to the Harmonized System. For each product-
year combination, counts are given both of the number of standards and of 
the number of pages of standards. In general, rapid growth is observed 
both in the number and average length of standards. 
 
Survey on EU-US NTBs Within the context of the "Study on Non-
Tariff Measures to EU-USA Trade and Investment" financed by the 
European Commission (and ending in 2010), the ECORYS’ team (see 
details at http://ntb.ecorys.com/) will identify the main NTMs (the final 
report is still forthcoming), based on “a worldwide business survey”.19 The 
business survey is used also to estimate the height of the NTMs (i.e. 
                                           
16 And freely available at 
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,content
MDK:21085342~pagePK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html 
17 available at http://spsims.wto.org/   
18 available at http://go.worldbank.org/6OEYNCYSD0 
19 The online business survey was closed by the end of July 2008 with 5.500 responses 
received. See 
http://ntm.ecorys.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=40&Itemid=94. 
Results not publicly available.  
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construct NTM indexes at country-pair level). For this reason, the survey is 
worldwide instead of just EU-US specific. They estimate the height of the 
NTMs compared to other countries that export to the EU and/or US. 
Similarly, the business survey collects detailed information on the main 
barriers to trade, investment and foreign affiliate sales for each sector. 
 
1.2 NTMs in WITS (World Integrated Trade Solution) 
 
The UNCTAD Trains database contains information on non-tariff 
measures following the categories summarized in table A1.2 (see the 
detailed UNCTAD Coding System of Trade Control Measures online 
http://r0.unctad.org/trains_new/tcm.shtm).  The UNCTAD-TRAINS 
website also reports information on which countries have submitted 
information on NTM (and the latest year for which such data are available 
(cf. http://r0.unctad.org/trains_new/datacoverage.shtm)    
 
 
Table A1.2. Non-Tariff Measures in TRAINS 
Code Measure Example 
3 Price Control minimum import price 
4 Finance Advance payment of customs duties 
5 Licensing Prior surveillance 
6 Quantity controls Seasonal quotas 
7 Monopolistic Sole importing agency 
8 Technical Packaging requirement 
Source: WITS summary TDW catalog (2009) 
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Annex 2.  
 
Annotated Bibliography of recent Papers dealing with the 
Measurement of NTMs  
 
 
[1]Anderson, J. and E. Van Wincoop (2004) “Trade Costs”, Journal of 
Economic Literature, 42(3), 691-751. 
 
Subject: Most thorough critical review of the literature on the size of 
international trade barriers with emphasis on methodological issues and 
on estimates of the ‘border effect’. Heavy emphasis on the benefits and 
costs of using the gravity model to assess trade costs.    
 
[2] APEC Secretariat (2005) Quantitative Methods for Assessing the 
Effects of NTM and Trade Facilitation, World Scientific. 
 
Subject: Introduction with collection of essays on NTMs (including in 
services). Most comprehensive review of different approaches at 
quantification. Includes several papers listed here (e.g. . Bora, Kuwahara 
and Laird, 2002, and Deardorff and Stern, 1997) and a short introduction 
to WITS. 
  
[3] Andriamananjara S., Dean J.M., Feinberg R., Ferrantino M.J., R. 
Ludema and M. Tsigas (2004, “The effects of Non-Tariff Measures on 
Prices, Trade and Welfare: CGE Implementation of Policy-Based Price 
Comparisons”, US international trade commission Working Paper #2004-
04-A (29 pages)  
 
Subject: Estimates the percentage increase in specific product prices 
across countries due to NTMs. Uses GTAP  simulations. Assesses the trade 
impact of different type of trade.  
Sample: 14 products and 18 countries/regional groups, year 2001. 
Data: 2 dummies for NTMs computed from UNCTAD trains data and 
USITC NTM database, prices data from the EIUS CityData. 
 
[4] Becker G., 2005, “Non-Tariff Measures –Issues for Sub-Saharan 
Africa”, UNDP report (105 pages). 
 
Subject: A standard discussion of NTMs. Notes that certain NTMs are 
more important than others for SSA countries (provides a checklist of 43 
priorities to consider!). Paper argues that regional integration in SSA could 
be a way to address NTMs (and also the EPA negotiations). No evidence to 
support the arguments in the paper.  
 
[5] Beghin J.C. and J.C. Bureau, 2001, “Quantification of Sanitary, 
Phytosanitary and Technical Barriers to trade for Trade Policy Analysis”, 
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Center for Agricultural and Rural Development Working Paper WP291 (35 
pages). 
 
Subject: exhaustive survey of literature that models and quantifies NTBs to 
trade in the agricultural and food sectors (price-wedge method, inventory-
based approaches, survey-based approaches, gravity-based approaches, 
risk-assessment-based cost-benefit measures, stylized microeconomic 
approaches, quantification using sectoral or multi-market models) 
 
 
[6] B. Bora, A. Kuwahara and S. Laird, 2002, “Quantification of non-tariff 
measures”, UNCTAD Policy issues series #18 (42 pages) 
 
Subject: Comprehensive review of various approaches to measure and 
quantify NTMs within the context of existing data sets. It covers much of 
the same ground as Deardorff and Stern (1997). Has a clear presentation of 
the pros and cons of different approaches.  
The paper applies the same methods as in other reports (i.e. inventory 
approach, tariff equivalent, TRI, etc.). The only tables reported are NTB 
coverage for selected countries and some frequency statistics of NTBs. The 
paper comes up with the same conclusion: “the existing collection on 
NTBs, while better than nothing, needs to be improved”. 
Part II, gives good and exhaustive description of available data on NTMs in 
WITS (products and countries coverage). Analysis is only in terms of 
frequency (the only analysis possible from WITS database). 
Sample: countries available in WITS, latest available year. 
Data: from WITS. 
 
[7] A.V. Deardorff and R. Stern, 1997, “Measurement of Non-Tariff 
Barriers”, OECD Working Papers #179 (117 pages) 
 
Subject: Thorough analytical framework that shows that one cannot 
satisfactorily isolate the effects of an NTB since the outcome of an NTB 
reflects the measure itself and any other changes, e.g. supply response. 
Assesses the different methods for quantifying NTBs. Subsequent papers 
are often very similar in methodology and classification to this paper. 
Classification of NTBs (The 5 broad categories of UNCTAD) : (1) 
quantitative restrictions and similar specific limitations; (2) non-tariff 
charges and related policies affecting imports; (3) government 
participation in trade, restrictive practices and more general government 
policies; (4) customs procedures and administrative practices and (5) 
technical barriers to trade (see their appendix 1). 
Reviews different measurement methods (with some descriptive 
statistics): 
The presence or size of NTBs (Frequency-type measures, price-comparison 
measures, quantity–impact measures as well as some NTB-specific 
methods) 
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The Effects of NTBs (effective rates of protection, effective rate of 
assistance, trade restrictiveness index, applied general equilibrium model 
measures).  
Sample: Case studies in the OECD pilot group. Selected countries for the 
OECD Pilot Group: Australia, Canada, Germany, Norway, United 
Kingdom/EU, US. 
Data: from UNCTAD database and diverse case studies on NTBs done in 
1995 
 
[8] W.A. Donelly and D. Manifold, 2005 “A compilation of Reported Non-
Tariff Measures : Description of the information”, US international trade 
commission Working Paper #2005-05-A (18 pages) 
 
Subject: This compilation provides information on the following 15 NTMs 
for goods and services 
 
Sample: 53 countries (table 1 page 3) with a focus on members of the APEC 
and FTAA.  
Data: 3 sources of information: 
1) the Office of the United States Trade Representative’s (USTR) National 
Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers (NTE);20  
2) the European Union’s (EU) Market Access Database;21  
3) the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Trade Policy Reviews.22 
Framework: Quantitative description from their matrix of data: number of 
each type of NTM per countries, or of each type of generic barriers by each 
category of NTM, number of NTM by sector and product, etc.  
 
[9] B. Hoekman and A. Nicita, 2008, “Trade policy, trade costs, and 
developing country trade”, World Bank Policy Research WP #4797 (29 
pages). 
 
Subject:  Thorough and most comprehensive aggregate measure of 
aggregate effects of NTMs on the volume of bilateral trade. Uses a gravity 
equation to assess the trade impact of different type of trade restrictions 
                                           
20 
http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2002/2002_NTE_Repo
rt/Section_Index.html  
21 http://mkaccdb.eu.int/mkaccdb2/indexPubli.htm 
22 http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tpr_e.htm   
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applied at the border. Use of several indexes of trade restriction ,i.e. the 
TRI of Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2008) and the overall trade 
restrictiveness index  (OTRI) used by the WB and the IMF (2008), the 
latter including both the effect of tariffs and NTMs. It is clearly superior to 
the more commonly used indicators such as NTM frequency and coverage 
ratios since it takes into account the elasticity of import demand with 
respect to prices.  
In addition to the OTRI (that captures only a subset of the policies that 
result in impediments to trade), NTMs are proxied by (1) Logistic 
performance index LP from the WB (2) the trade facilitation index from 
the IMD’s World Competitiveness yearbook 2000 and others (3) the 
“Doing Business” cost of trading from Djankov, Freund and Cong 2006. 
All these indicators are included in a cross section gravity equation 
estimated using the PPML estimator.  
Sample: 104 importers and 115 exporters, year 2006. 
Data: See above 
 
[10] L.A. Linkins and H.M. Arce, 1994 revised in 2002, “Estimating Tariff-
Equivalents on Non-Tariff Barriers”, US international trade commission 
Working Paper #1994-06-A(r) (23 pages) 
 
Subject: Reviews the measurement of NTBs with a specific focus on 
commonly used methods for measuring tariff equivalents (Frequency 
measures, restrictiveness of quantitative restraints, estimation of tariff or 
export tax equivalents, etc.). Provide a comparison of the Canadian and US 
applications. Same approach and classification as in [2] 
Classification of NTBs = still the 5 broad categories of UNCTAD. 
Sample: Canada and US. 
Data: from Canada’s department of finance (1988) and US international 
trade commission (1991). 
 
[11] World Bank (2008a), “A Survey of Non-Tariff Measures in the East 
Asia and Pacific Region”, Policy Research Report 
 
Subject: Up-to-date review of the literature on NTM measurement along 
the lines in Bora et al. (2002) and Deardorff and Stern (1997) recognizing 
that their effects cannot be measured satisfactorily, nor can they be 
ranked, justifying a case study approach. Good discussion of the avenues 
to reduce NTMs at the multilateral (WTO) and at the regional levels and of 
the experience of the EU, NAFTA, and ASEAN.  
Sample: 10 Country Studies bases on survey of exporters. Concludes that 
compliance costs vary across three dimensions: (i) exporters for given 
NTMs; (ii) across product categories i.e. agriculture vs. manufactures; (iii) 
and across destinations i.e. the EU and US vs. a developing country like 
China. 
 
